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
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## The DCI's Warning Committee's

# **Atrocities Watchlist**




FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

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AL 99-001
May 1999

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The Warning Committee, <sup>1</sup> in conjunction with the National Intelligence Officer for Economics and Global Issues, is issuing the second quarterly Atrocities Watchlist.

## Atrocities Watchlist <sup>2</sup>

Watchlist includes countries where there is evidence of or the potential for significant political repression or systematic human rights abuses that could lead to a deliberate pattern of widespread atrocities or a major humanitarian emergency over the next 12 months. "Atrocities" include killings, maiming, or forced expulsions of the population. The list also includes countries in which ongoing violence could escalate and lead to a deliberate pattern of atrocities against unarmed civilians.

#### Level of Concern

• (As compared to the Atrocities section in *The Warning Committee's Watchlist Supplement*, 5 February 1999)

#### **Immediate Concern**

- ⇒ **DROC:** The power vacuum and the war create an environment conducive to atrocities by rebel forces, pro-Kabila troops, and armed groups beholden to neither side.
  - Civilians report that both sides are raping, torturing, and killing members of rival ethnic groups and noncombatants suspected of providing support to the enemy. Poor troop discipline and the difficulty of controlling disparate rebel groups will most likely continue to contribute to human rights violations. Pro-Kabila forces, taking significant casualties and losing territory, may take out their growing frustrations on civilian populations.

A humanitarian emergency caused by a natural disaster or even a conflict where only incidental or random human rights abuses occur is not included on this list.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Warning Committee is chaired by the National Intelligence Officer for Warning and is composed of representatives of the Directors of the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency; the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. Comments and inquiries may be directed to the National Intelligence Officer for Warning on

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- FRY-Kosovo: FRY army, police, and paramilitary units in Kosovo will continue ethnic cleansing and other atrocities against Albanian Kosovars. In addition, NATO military action may provoke attacks by ethnic Serbs on minorities in other areas of the FRY.
  - Serb forces may attack ethnic Albanians and Kosovar refugees in Montenegro, Slavic Muslims in the Sandjak—thousands of whom have already fled low-level persecution—or, less likely, the ethnic Magyars in the Vojvodina, which could bring retaliation from Hungary.
- ⇔ Iraq: Baghdad continues to repress large segments of the Iraqi populace as part of its efforts to reestablish total territorial control and stifle the activities of Western or Iranian-supported political opposition groups. In recent months, Saddam has launched brutal crackdowns to curb the influence of Shia clerics and is likely to continue repressive measures as he battles emboldened Shia insurgent groups.
  - Since the February 1999 assassination of Shia cleric Al-Sadr, Baghdad has announced the execution of 12 Shia clerics and seminary students and deployed military units to Shia-occupied areas. It has also reportedly attacked civilian religious worshippers in an attempt to prevent prayer services.
- ⇔ **Sierra Leone:** The prospects for more widespread atrocities will grow if the rebels believe their position on the battlefield or at the negotiating table is weakening. Pro-government militias and Nigerian soldiers also are likely to resume summary executions and other human rights abuses if fighting intensifies.
  - A humanitarian crisis is probably under way in two-thirds of the country, to which relief workers have had no access since rebels launched a major offensive in December 1998. Hundreds of thousands of displaced civilians increasingly risk starvation and disease as the rainy season approaches, and fighting prevents farmers from preparing their fields. All civilians, especially children, are at high risk for abduction, forced removal, rape, amputation, torture, and execution by rebels, who routinely use atrocities as a military tactic.





⇔ <b>Burundi:</b> Despite significant progress made in the Arusha peace process to resolve Burundi's political problems, underlying ethnic antagonism between majority Hutu population and the minority Tutsi military government linger Burundi's history shows the potential for extreme violence lies just below surface.	en the ers.
• The International Red Cross (ICRC) signed an accord with the governor of Burundi on 30 March to resume operations after a three-year absorbance (ICRC) operations will resume slowly and will not include the "field period tion activities" that led to tensions with the Burundian military in the state of	ence. protec-
⇔ Congo (Brazzaville): The potential for major human rights violations remainshigh, despite the slowing of military operations by both sides.	ains
• Repressive measures by the government have fueled additional armetance and undermined meager efforts at reconciliation. Sporadic, low fighting is likely to persist, as are human rights abuses by poorly trained undisciplined forces on both sides.	v-level
⇔ <b>Liberia:</b> The risk of atrocities against civilians, especially civic leaders an minorities, remains high as President Charles Taylor and his security force	

stockpile weapons and threaten violence in even minor disputes.



• An unpredictable event, such as an attempt on Taylor's life, could unleash widespread fighting and a sudden humanitarian crisis. Most of the security forces are underpaid, undisciplined, and prone to overreact. They would target unarmed civilians if social order broke down. Liberian troops returning from Sierra Leone could act with the same brutality at home.

North Korea:\* Kim Chong-il's continued pursuit of failed socialist economic policies and the repression of any political opposition leave the North once again unable to feed itself or to export goods in return for food. International aid is targeted mostly at children and still plentiful food in the urban markets is available only to those with money. This leaves a large number of poor North Koreans increasingly at risk of starvation early this summer before the first crops come in.

• Additional US food assistance set for delivery this summer and later will help many North Koreans escape the worst shortages, but it will not affect the poverty that is now the root cause of the most acute suffering. Kim could boost food supplies by using hard currency from Hyundai's tourism project—nearly \$200 million this year, or enough for nearly 1 million tons of corn—or smaller amounts of hard currency devoted to the military and imported luxury goods.

**Rwanda:** The Tutsi-led government has restored security to most of the country, but residual tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi populations following the 1994 massacre of 800,000 Tutsis impede efforts at reconciliation.

•	<ul> <li>The eventual return of Hutu rebel forces from the war in the</li> </ul>	DROC could re-
	kindle the insurgency in the northwest and lead to renewed	ethnic violence.



<sup>\*</sup> New to Watchlist



### **Also Watching**

**Angola:**\* The resumption of the civil war in December 1998 led to increased population displacement, economic disruption, and "collateral damage" from the fighting. However, we lack information on the extent to which either side is targeting civilians.

• Although neither side has made a policy of targeting civilians in this long-standing civil war, relief supplies to civilians have been disrupted or cut off, and relief workers have been threatened and killed. The rainy season will cease around the end of May and fighting between the government and rebels is expected to pick up, resulting in the displacement of a larger number of civilians. The movement of civilians will place a heavier burden on relief organizations.

**Indonesia–East Timor:**\* With the election environment volatile and prospects for a diplomatic resolution to the political status of East Timor uncertain, the potential exists for violence to escalate.

• A breakdown of law and order in East Timor could include systemic attacks by pro-integration militias against persons they suspect are proindependence.

**Macedonia:** \* Massive refugee flows from Kosovo and a collapsing economy could prompt Slavs and pro-Serbian groups in Macedonia to turn against refugees from Kosovo and the local Albanian minority.

• The steady stream of refugees from Kosovo has overburdened local social and economic resources and threatens to disrupt the fragile political balance. Over time, it may cause the country to fracture along ethnic lines, creating a major humanitarian emergency.

<sup>\*</sup> New to Watchlist